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  Letter dated 23 December 2016 from the Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of 
the Security Council 
 
 
 The Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, whose 
mandate was extended pursuant to Security Council resolution 2293 (2016), has the 
honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 9 of the resolution, the 
midterm report on its work. 
 The report was provided to the Security Council Committee established pursuant 
to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 
23 November 2016 and was considered by the Committee on 14 December 2016.  
 The Group would appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought 
to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of 
the Council. 
 
 
(Signed) Michael J. Sharp 
Coordinator 
Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
(Signed) Zobel Behalal 
Expert  
(Signed) Zaida Catalán 
Expert  
(Signed) Roberto Sollazzo 
Expert  
(Signed) Christoph Vogel 
Expert  
(Signed) David Zounmenou 
Expert 
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  Midterm report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo 
 
 
 
 Summary 
 Since the submission of the previous report (S/2016/466), in May 2016, the 
overall security situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has not improved. 
Recent months were characterized by an increase in political tension owing to the  
de facto postponement of the national elections initially scheduled for December 
2016. This led to protests on 19 September, during which dozens of civilians were 
killed or arrested in the capital, Kinshasa. While there was a political dialogue 
between the Government and some opposition groups, the risk of further election -
related violence remains. 
 Foreign armed groups remained active in the eastern Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. The Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda continued to pose a 
threat to the security of North Kivu. The group was seriously weakened, however, by 
continuing military operations and an internal split that led to the loss of one third to 
one half of its members to the newly created Conseil national pour le renouveau et la 
démocratie-Ubwiyunge. Both of these groups collaborated with local a rmed groups, 
such as Nyatura. 
 The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) continued to operate in Beni territory and 
recruited nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda in 
2016. At least one group within ADF attacked civilians in the period under review. 
 The Group notes that efforts to launch gold traceability programmes have not 
yet become operational. Meanwhile, gold remains by far the mineral most used to 
finance armed elements and criminal networks. A positive development was the 
launch of investigations into the involvement in natural resources of some Congolese 
military officers previously mentioned in the Group’s reports for such involvement. 
Nevertheless, some senior officers continue to be implicated in gold exploitation and 
trade, on occasion in collaboration with private companies.  
 Challenges in fully implementing due diligence in the tin, tantalum and 
tungsten sector remain a threat to the positive developments noted by the Group in 
previous reports. While traceability and certification processes are expanding, armed 
actors do occasionally interfere in sites certified as conflict free.  
 The Garamba National Park continued to be the main source of trafficking in 
ivory, although elephant poaching in general is diminishing as a source of financing 
for the Lord’s Resistance Army.  
 The Group remains concerned about the widespread violations of human rights 
and international humanitarian law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In Beni 
territory, the killing of civilians, such as in a massacre in Rwangoma in August 2016, 
continued unabated. In addition, the tit-for-tat violence previously investigated by 
the Group in Lubero territory spread south into Rutshuru, involving some of the 
same dynamics and actors. 
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 The crossing of armed members of the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement/Army in Opposition into the Democratic Republic of the Congo was a 
violation of the arms embargo. The Group also remains concerned about the 
persistent inefficiency of stockpile management and the challenges of marking the 
estimated 300,000 small arms in a timely manner. These deficiencies make it 
difficult to track weapons and ammunition diverted from government stocks to 
armed groups. 
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 I. Background  
 
 
1. The Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo notes with 
appreciation the support provided to its work by the Chair of the Security Council 
Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1533 (2004) 
concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Amr Abdellatif Aboulatta (Egypt), 
during his visit to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda 
between 1 and 6 August 2016. The Group also notes the visit of the Securi ty Council 
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 11 to 14 November, during which it 
expressed concern about the current political situation and associated tensions.  
2. In accordance with the request made by the Security Council in paragraph 11 
of its resolution 2293 (2016), the Group exchanged information with the panels of 
experts on the Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Sudan.  
 
 
 A. Cooperation with the United Nations Organization Stabilization 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
 
 
3. The Group appreciates the support and collaboration of the United Nations 
Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(MONUSCO) during the period under review.  
 
 
 B. Compliance with the Group’s requests for information 
 
 
4. During the first part of its mandate, the Group addressed 39 official 
communications to Member States, international organizations and priva te entities. 
It will report fully on the replies received in its final report.  
 
 
 C. Methodology 
 
 
5. The Group used the evidentiary standards recommended by the Informal 
Working Group of the Security Council on General Issues of Sanctions 
(see S/2006/997, annex). The Group based its findings on documents and, wherever 
possible, on first-hand, on-site observations by the experts themselves. When this 
was not possible, the Group corroborated information by using a t least three 
independent and reliable sources.  
6. Given the nature of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, few 
documents provide definitive proof of arms transfers, recruitment, command 
responsibility for grave human rights abuses and the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources. The Group therefore relied on eyewitness testimony from members of 
local communities, ex-combatants and current members of armed groups. The 
Group also considered the expert testimony of government officials and military 
officers from the Great Lakes region and United Nations sources.  
7. The present report covers investigations up to and including 15 November 
2016. Investigations relevant to the Group’s mandate that occurred thereafter will be 
reflected in its final report. 
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 II. Armed groups 
 
 
 A. Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda 
 
 
8. The Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR),1 a sanctioned 
entity, was significantly weakened during the period under review. More than 
50 officers, led by the Second Vice-President of FDLR, “Colonel” Laurent 
Ndagijimana (also known as Wilson Irategeka), defected to create a new group called 
the Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie-Ubwiyunge (CNRD). At least 
another 15 officers, including the sanctioned individual and former FDLR Chief of 
Staff, “Brigadier General” Léopold Mujyambere (also known as Achille Musenyeri), 
were captured or turned themselves in during the same period, showing a marked 
increase in desertion. Those losses forced the restructuring of the entire group. 
9. In addition, operations carried out by the Armed Forces of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo —
FARDC), in some cases supported by MONUSCO troops, and by local Congolese  
armed groups continued to destabilize the remaining FDLR cadres, who are now 
almost completely limited to Rutshuru territory, North Kivu. The Group previously 
estimated FDLR numbers at between 1,400 and 1,600 (see S/2016/466, para. 7), but 
believes that as many as half of that number have been lost to CNRD and defections 
in the previous six months. 
 
  Split 
 
10. The Group previously reported that internal divisions in FDLR were being 
accentuated by military pressure (see ibid., para. 6). The divisions led to a formal 
split in May 2016, immediately after the FDLR leadership committee suspended 
Ndagijimana. According to an FDLR press release, the suspension was for 
violations of internal rules, including abuse of power, inciting discord and 
insubordination (see annex 1). Ndagijimana, on the other hand, claimed that his 
separation from FDLR was due to the group holding Rwandan refugees hostage and 
preventing them from returning to Rwanda (see annex 2).  
11. FDLR and CNRD combatants told the Group that the split stemmed from the 
conflict between Ndagijimana and the FDLR Interim President and sanctioned 
individual, “Major General” Gaston Iyamuremye (also known as Victor Byiringiro), 
over the biometric registration of Rwandan refugees (see S/2016/466, para. 14). 
Ndagijimana was in favour and Iyamuremye against. Internal documents  show that 
the FDLR leadership under Iyamuremye went so far as to order its units to “punish 
political and military leaders involved in the biometric registration” and stressed the 
need to “fight the nomadism of the [Rwandan] refugees” (see annex 3).  
12. In addition to its Second Vice-President, FDLR lost dozens of its officers to 
CNRD. An FDLR leader gave the Group a list of 46 of the officers formally 
considered to have deserted (see annex 4). According to interviews conducted by the 
Group, however, the number of officers is likely to be even higher.  
__________________ 
 
1  Unless otherwise specified, “FDLR” refers to FDLR-FOCA (Forces combattantes Abacunguzi), 
as opposed to any other splinter groups such as the Rassemblement pour l’unité et la démocratie -
Urunana or FDLR-Soki. 
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13. Losses from this split left large holes in the FDLR hierarchy, leading to a 
complete restructuring (see annex 5). All but one of the sanctioned individuals 
within the FDLR leadership remained in the movement, however, and continued in 
roles of influence. The overall military commander, “Lieutenant General” Sylvestre 
Mudacumura (also known as Bernard Mupenzi), remained in his position, and the 
former North Kivu sector commander, “Brigadier General” Pacifique Ntawunguka 
(also known as Omega Israel), became his new deputy. Except for Ndagijimana’s 
suspension, the FDLR political leadership remained as previously reported 
(see S/2016/466, annex 6). An FDLR document dated 8 June 2016 confirmed that 
two sanctioned individuals, Iyamuremye and the Executive Secretary, Callixte 
Mbarushimana, remained in their positions (see annex 3).  
 
  Sukola II operations 
 
14. Senior FARDC officers told the Group that one of the primary goals in the 
continuing Sukola II operations was to target the top FDLR leadership. This 
included Mudacumura, Ntawunguka and Iyamuremye, all sanctioned individuals.  
15. While the three remain at large, several key officers were captured in recent 
months. These included the former Chief of Staff, Mujyambere, the head of 
intelligence, “Colonel” Joseph Habyarimana (also known as Sophonie Mucebo), and 
the head of Mudacumura’s protection unit, “Major” Patrick Nsabimana (also known 
as Vainqueur Mugisha). According to the statistics provided by FARDC, 99 FDLR 
combatants were killed and another 137 captured between 12 March and 
15 November 2016 (see annex 6).2 During the same period, MONUSCO reported 
demobilizing 419 FDLR combatants, including 11 officers (see annex 7). 
16. As at October 2016, the remaining FDLR positions were almost all in 
Rutshuru territory, North Kivu. The Group identified several main concentrations 
around Kiringa, Kahumiro and Kazaroho and in the Virunga National Park at Camp 
Paris and next to the Nyiragongo volcano (see annex 8). Most of the positions were 
in the same place or very close to former positions identified by the Group (see 
S/2016/466, annex 9). 
17. In response to the continuing pressure of operations and ever-decreasing 
numbers of combatants, FDLR has increased its collaboration with several 
Congolese Nyatura groups, which act as force multipliers. Ex -combatants from 
Nyatura groups under commanders “Domi” and “John Love”, in addition to FDL R 
ex-combatants, told the Group that FDLR provided weapons and training to Nyatura 
and that they carried out operations together. FDLR also continued its guerrilla -style 
attacks on FARDC, avoiding any direct, sustained confrontations, pursuant to an 
operational directive issued by Mudacumura early in 2016 (see annex 9). These 
strategies were also used to recoup materiel (see annex 10).  
 
  Recruitment 
 
18. Entering 2016, FDLR was already facing a serious shortage of human 
resources. Many units, including Chypre (see paras. 20-22 below), were well below 
__________________ 
 
2  Statistics were provided from the beginning of the Sukola II operations in January 2015. 
Disaggregation was possible only by using the statistics provided up to 12 March 2016 for the 
previous report (see S/2016/466, annex 10). 
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half strength. According to an FDLR end-of-year report, desertion rates had 
increased, with Congolese combatants making up two thirds of the losses. The 
FDLR response was to focus on recruiting Congolese nationals and Rwandan 
refugees, mobilizing friendly Congolese armed groups and making it more difficult 
for their combatants to gain access to demobilization programmes (see annex 10). 
The last-mentioned activity is a sanctionable offence under paragraph 7 (b) of 
Security Council resolution 2293 (2016). 
19. FDLR was able to recruit and train new combatants in 2016, even while 
operations were being carried out against it. Documents recovered in June by 
MONUSCO show that subsector Sinai (see para. 20 below) organized at least two 
training sessions in the first half of the year, in February and May. One was carried 
out over a four-week period for 24 recruits. Training modules included first aid, 
weapons, tactics, intelligence gathering, internal regulations and ideology 
(see annex 11). The other, for 17 combatants, was focused on the mastery of light 
machine guns and RPG-7 grenade launchers (see annex 12).  
 
  Case study: Chypre company 
 
20. The two operational subsectors of FDLR, Sinai and Canaan, are made up of at 
least four companies. One Sinai company, Chypre, serves as an example of the dire 
state of an FDLR unit in 2016. A yearly report from January shows that the 
company was composed of only 31 healthy combatants, divided into a nine-man 
command unit, a four-man special weapons team and three platoons, Cnide, Cilicie 
and Crète, with five to seven combatants each. The unit was commanded by 
“Major” Jacob Che Guevara.3 Eight additional combatants were assigned to the 
company, but were handicapped or otherwise unable to perform their duties 
(see annex 13). 
21. The company had more weapons than combatants. All 31 were assigned 
automatic rifles (30 Kalashnikov-pattern and 1 FN-FAL), while five light machine 
guns, four RPG-7 grenade launchers and two 60-mm mortars were in the unit’s 
cache or on loan to another unit. According to Chypre’s records, all but three of the 
weapons were categorized as being in good condition. The company’s munitions 
stocks show why the heavier weapons remained in the cache: it had only three 
mortar bombs, three PG-7 grenades and three anti-tank rockets. Ammunition 
supplies for the Kalashnikov-pattern rifles and light machine guns were slightly 
better, but would not allow for sustained operations (see annex 13). 
22. The military pressure and territorial losses notwithstanding, FDLR units 
continued to generate revenue through “non-conventional logistics” (see S/2016/466, 
paras. 23-28). The financial records of the Chypre company recovered in June 2016 
go back to November 2012 (see annex 14). During that period, the company 
registered income from taxing vehicles, hunting and selling wood and agricultural 
products. In 2016, most of the business was carried out by the three aforementioned 
platoons, which then contributed a portion of their earnings to the unit’s coffers. The  
major expenses were foodstuffs, medicine, office supplies and calling credit. The 
ledger shows only two purchases of materiel in 2013, a total of 920 rounds of 
__________________ 
 
3  He was later transferred and made head of administration for the Sinai subsector, with “Captain” 
Médard Byiringiro taking over from him in Chypre. His predecessor was Asifiwe Manudi.  
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7.62x39-mm ammunition for $35, and no purchases between then and mid -2016. On 
two occasions, expenses were reported for hosting members of FARDC, most 
recently a “Major John” on 3 February 2015.  
 
 
 B. Conseil national pour le renouveau et la démocratie 
 
 
23. On 31 May 2016, CNRD broke away from FDLR. It took between one third 
and one half of FDLR with it, including at least 46 officers and the entirety of the 
South Kivu operational sector. CNRD announced that it would bring about the 
repatriation of Rwandan refugees and combatants from the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, but has not yet taken steps to implement such plans. If nothing else, 
however, CNRD represents a serious weakening of FDLR and the sanctioned 
individuals who lead it. 
24. The FDLR reaction to Ndagijimana’s desertion was to launch operations 
against CNRD in North Kivu, seeking to destabilize the new movement before it 
could establish itself. Most of the fighting took place in June and July, with both 
sides looking to control the heavy weaponry and the refugee population. During that 
time, the various Nyatura factions were forced to choose a side, with the group 
under Kasongo Kalamo ultimately choosing CNRD. The Group notes that the 
FDLR-focused Sukola II strategy (see para. 14) benefited CNRD, which was not 
attacked by FARDC during the period under review.  
 
  Objectives 
 
25. In a press release on 31 May 2016, CNRD gave its primary priority as the 
dignified return of Rwandan refugees (see annex 2); it presented itself as a clear 
separation from the “hardliners” in FDLR, including sanctioned individuals 
Mudacumura and Iyamuremye. The Group notes that the CNRD President, 
“Colonel” Ndagijimana, was a key driver of the FDLR voluntary disarmament 
process in 2013-2014 (see S/2015/797, paras. 23-25) and supported the biometric 
registration of refugees by the Congolese National Commission for Refugees.  
26. In late June, however, CNRD indicated that its objectives were to support t he 
Rwandan refugee population in securing recognition, protection and humanitarian 
aid; to work with other Rwandan opposition parties to pressure the Government of 
Rwanda into opening political space; and to bring about true reconciliation in 
Rwandan society (see annex 15). Those objectives do not rule out the return of 
Rwandan refugees or CNRD combatants, but do closely align with the objectives of 
FDLR, focusing on political changes that would need to happen in Rwanda before 
they could return. The objectives, along with the establishment of a military 
hierarchy, suggest that the promised return to Rwanda will be delayed.  
 
  Structure and organization 
 
27. As at late October 2016, CNRD had established a partial political and military 
structure. The political side was led by Ndagijimana as the president, with Jean -
Marie Nyawenda (also known as David Mukiza) as the executive secretary, 
“Lieutenant Colonel” Barnabé Sinayobye (also known as Morane) as the 
spokesperson and “Brigadier General” Jean-Pierre Gansenyi (also known as Eliezel 
Niyirora or Habacuc Bomoi) as the defence commissioner (see annex 16).  
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28. In the same way that FDLR has a military wing called FOCA, CNRD created 
its own military wing, the Front de libération nationale (FLN). FLN consists of two 
operational sectors, one in North Kivu and one in South Kivu, with two 
geographical axes in each. Command of FLN was given to the former FDLR South 
Kivu sector commander, “Colonel” Hamada Harerimana (also known as Junior 
Mulamba). “Colonel” Anastase Munyaneza (also known as Job Rukundo) became 
the South Kivu sector commander and “Colonel” Shemeki became the North Kivu 
sector commander (see annex 16). The only sanctioned individual who joined 
CNRD is the new head of operations in South Kivu, “Colonel”  Félicien 
Nzanzubukira (also known as Fred Irakiza).  
29. Just as FDLR, CNRD has lost officers to desertion in recent months. One was 
“Major” Gilbert Ndayambaje (also known as Castro Rafiki). MONUSCO turned 
him over to the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo after his 
surrender on 31 August 2016, given that he was under investigation for alleged 
command responsibility for crimes, including a massacre carried out in Kamananga, 
South Kivu, on 14 May 2012. 
30. As at October 2016, CNRD in North Kivu was located in western Rutshuru 
and eastern Masisi territories, separated from FDLR by the Nyanzalé -Mweso road. 
In South Kivu, there was a change in name only; all units previously associated with 
FDLR joined CNRD. Combatants remain around the Hewa Bora forest in southern 
Mwenga and western Fizi territories, as well as in the sector of Itombwe and the 
Burhinyi chiefdom of Mwenga territory.  
 
 
 C. Allied Democratic Forces 
 
 
31. In its previous report, the Group presented a broader picture of the armed 
group dynamics in Beni territory: ADF was operating in disparate locations and 
with limited central command and control, while other local armed groups were 
shown to be playing a larger role in the instability than previously reported 
(see S/2016/466, paras. 51-69 and 182-197).4 The Group’s investigations are 
continuing; while the most recent findings relate to the ADF group under Seka 
Baluku, this represents only a part of the larger picture of ADF and the armed gro up 
dynamics in the area. 
32. In October, the Group spoke with five recently captured or surrendered 
combatants from a core group of at least several hundred ADF combatants under the 
command of Seka Baluku. The Sukola I military operations, with the renewed  
support of MONUSCO and its intervention brigade, exerted pressure in 2016 on the 
Baluku group, including through operations to temporarily clear its main 
conglomeration of bases, known as Madina II. Nevertheless, this ADF group 
continues to recruit, train and operate in the dense forest east of the Eringeti-Beni-
Butembo axis, causing serious insecurity for civilians in the area.  
33. According to interviews with those combatants, many previously identified 
ADF leaders remain at large. Those cited most frequently include the overall 
commander, Seka Baluku; commanders Amigo, Fezza, Kikutte, Muzzanganda and 
__________________ 
 
4  The Group identified more than half a dozen local armed groups operating in the area, including 
Mai-Mai groups such as “Corps de Christ”, the most recent to emerge.  
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Rafiki; and two religious leaders, Sheikh Lumisa and Sheikh Koko (see S/2015/19, 
annexes 3 and 4).5 
34. The Group also received copies of documents recovered by FARDC in 
Madina II, most of which were in Arabic or Luganda. They provide insight into 
existing networks used by the Baluku group, investigations into which are 
continuing. They also reinforce previous findings about ADF internal religious and 
social structures.  
 
  Sukola I operations 
 
35. During the period under review, FARDC and MONUSCO carried out two 
large-scale operations against ADF: Usalama I and Usalama II. Following the 
signing of a technical agreement by the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo and MONUSCO on 28 January 2016, the MONUSCO support for 
FARDC operations in the Sukola I operational sector went beyond the logistical and 
intelligence contributions seen during 2015. The intervention brigade, and in some 
cases elements of the North Kivu brigade, saw direct involvement in operations, 
contributing ground troops and special forces, artillery and air assets.  
36. Joint offensives led to the capture on 13 May and 15/16 September 2016 of 
Madina II bases, east of Mayi Moya in Beni territory. Each time, FARDC withdrew 
after the operation and, as at mid-October, the Baluku group had returned to and 
reoccupied the camps. A Sukola I commander told the Group that FARDC had also 
captured three ADF positions near Mwalika, south-east of the town of Beni, in a 
unilateral operation on 22 September.  
 
  Camps 
 
37. The ADF combatants in the Baluku group referred to their largest grouping of 
camps as Madina II, made up of three camps, Whisper, Headquarters and Bayt 
al-Mal,6 along with defensive positions set up around the perimeter and on 
footpaths. Combatants from the camps, in addition to FARDC officers involved in 
the assaults on the camps, estimated the number of combatants there at between 2 00 
and 300, including men, women and children.  
38. FARDC and MONUSCO cleared the camps in mid-May and mid-September 
2016, recovering documents and finding a system of bunkers (see annex 17). While 
the Group had previously documented underground bunkers used as prisons in other 
ADF camps (see S/2014/428, annex 10), ADF combatants told the Group that the 
bunkers in Madina II had been dug for protection from aerial and artillery attacks 
and to avoid detection by MONUSCO unmanned aerial vehicles. After abandoning 
the positions, ADF returned and, as at mid -October, was still occupying the camps.  
39. The aforementioned combatants also told the Group about a training camp, 
called Miba, in the Mwalika area, some 30 km south-east of the town of Beni 
(see annex 18). Recruits from the Democratic Republic of the Congo and abroad 
__________________ 
 
5  The Group notes that ADF sometimes recycles names after the loss of a celebrated individual. 
This was the case with Toyota, whose name was given to a promising recruit in mid -2016. 
 
6  This means “house of money/wealth” in Arabic and usually refers to the storehouse within an 
ADF camp, where food and other supplies are kept. In this case, however, it was the name of a 
position that included the storehouse for all of Madina II.  
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were first brought there for training before being taken north to the main camps, 
such as Madina II. Salimu, Werason and Rafiki were all mentioned as involved in 
giving military training — the latter two being ADF trainers previously mentioned 
by the Group (see S/2015/19, para. 24). 
 
  Recruitment, training and supply 
 
40. The Baluku group continued to recruit and train new combatants in 2016, the 
pressure of the military operations notwithstanding. The five former combatants, 
comprising two nationals of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, one of Rwanda 
and two of Uganda, were all recruited in 2016. All claimed to have been tricked or 
coerced into joining: four had been promised work and one kidnapped. The 
recruitment methods are consistent with those previously reported by the Group 
(see ibid., para. 20). The training sessions involving these individuals included 
several dozen other new recruits, which helps to explain how the group 
compensated for battlefield losses and desertions.  
41. Four ex-combatants told the Group that, as at mid-2016, the Baluku group had 
sufficient weapons to arm each combatant. Most had been assigned Kalashnikov-
pattern rifles, but the arsenal also included light machine guns and grenade 
launchers. The group also continued to deploy simple improvised explosive devices, 
with a commander, Muzzanganda, still cited as the bomb maker (see ibid., 
paras. 39-40).  
 
  Rules and regulations 
 
42. Internal documents show that ADF still has a functioning internal security 
service, known as “II” (see ibid., annex 9), which enforces rules and regulations 
dictating all aspects of life within the group. The documents show punishments of 
between 60 and 500 lashes for infractions such as leaving a camp without 
permission, making a fire in the morning, being lazy, engaging in idle chatter, 
disobeying orders, talking during prayer and sleeping while on watch  (see 
annex 19). 
43. Other documents demonstrate the continued importance of religion in the 
Baluku group and the basis for some of the punishable violations mentioned above. 
Two of the Arabic-language documents contain teachings that explain that God 
abhors idle chatter and excessive questions, for example. Most of the Arabic -
language documents were prayers of supplication, asking for protection against 
enemies in a time of need. Verses are cited that give encouragement with a message 
of the faithful being rewarded and delivered from their troubles (see annex 20).  
 
 
 D. Nyatura 
 
 
44. Local armed groups, known under the umbrella term Nyatura, were more 
active in the period under review. Previously reported as having generally 
collaborative relations with FDLR (see S/2016/466, annex 3), the FDLR/CNRD 
split forced some of them to choose sides, and they were subsequently caught up in 
the fighting between the two factions.  
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45. Nyatura groups largely comprise members of the Hutu community in Rutshuru 
and Masisi territories. While some emerged recently, many of the groups had their 
origins in former armed movements such as the Coalition des patriotes résistants 
congolais (see S/2008/773, paras. 114-120) and arose as a response to a perceived 
threat by FARDC units led by other communities. The Group identified 10 Nyatura 
groups currently active in North Kivu: 3 in Rutshuru territory and 7 in Masisi 
territory (see annex 21). 
46. Ex-combatants from FDLR and various Nyatura factions told the Group that 
FDLR had provided weapons and training to Nyatura groups and that they carried 
out operations together in 2016. For both FDLR and CNRD, Nyatura groups 
represent not only a connection to the local population, but also a source of human 
resources, for whom they can provide training and weaponry. 
47. Some of the Nyatura groups have also been involved in fighting with FARDC 
and other local armed groups, such as Mai-Mai Mazembe and Nduma défense du 
Congo-Rénové (NDC-R), a situation that has led to serious human rights abuses 
(see paras. 103-107). In September 2016, MONUSCO reported that Nyatura groups 
were the non-State actors causing the highest number of victims of human rights 
violations. 
 
  Nyatura John Love and Nyatura Domi-Forces des patriotes congolais 
 
48. While some Nyatura groups aligned themselves with CNRD, others remained 
important allies to FDLR. Two of the most active of these were led by 
Muhawenimana Bunombe (also known as John Love) and Ndaruhutse Kamanzi 
(also known as Domi). 
49. John Love, a Congolese national from Bwito chiefdom, controls one of the 
most active Nyatura groups in Rutshuru territory. He was originally trained as an 
FDLR combatant, before leaving on good terms to create his own group. His 
headquarters are in Muriki, 8 km east of Nyanzalé, and additional positions are 
close to Kiniatsi, Ngoroba and Munguli (see annex 22). As with many other 
Congolese armed groups, the number of members varies from week to week owing 
to operational losses and desertions. Nevertheless, the Group estimates this  faction 
to have between 50 and 100 combatants. Ex-combatants told the Group that they 
had around 40 Kalashnikov-pattern rifles and a machine gun. They also admitted to 
the Group that they would regularly steal food and money from the local population.  
50. Nyatura Domi is based in Bukombo and collaborates with Nyatura John Love. 
Ex-combatants told the Group that they had more than 50 fighters with 15 
Kalashnikov-pattern rifles and two machine guns, and that they wore partial 
FARDC uniforms. Similar to Nyatura John Love, they engaged in looting and theft 
to maintain their supplies. 
 
  Bashali chiefdom demobilization efforts 
 
51. The Group notes that there were local disarmament efforts in the period under 
review, including in Masisi territory. One notable example was a ceremony on 
23 August 2016 led by the customary chief of the Bashali chiefdom and several 
local and provincial politicians. The ceremony took place with the participation of 
the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain, in addition to the 
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Nyatura factions led by Bigirabagabo and Kasongo Kalamo (also known as Forces 
de défense des droits humains — FDDH) (see annex 23). 
52. According to FARDC sources, Nyatura FDDH brought 24 combatants to the 
ceremony and surrendered two Kalashnikov-pattern rifles and a machine gun. 
Bigirabagabo’s group surrendered 20 Kalashnikov-pattern rifles, a machine gun and 
a mortar. The Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain handed over 
15 Kalashnikov-pattern rifles. This was not a full demobilization for any of the 
groups, however. A few weeks after the ceremony, an attack in Kitchanga, during 
which seven people were abducted, was attributed to Bigirabagabo’s group.  
 
 
 III. Natural resources 
 
 
53. Since the beginning of its mandate, the Group has conducted field visits in 
North and South Kivu, Ituri, Haut-Uélé and Tshopo for investigations relating to 
gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten and ivory. The Group found that some armed 
elements and criminal networks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were 
continuing their illegal involvement in the exploitation and trade of these resources.  
54. As previously documented, armed groups are no longer as physically present 
on a permanent basis at mining sites. More often, they are involved in pillaging an d 
taxation (see S/2016/466, para. 129). The Group notes that FARDC elements have 
continued to interfere in the natural resources sector, but cannot conclude that this 
was done with the agreement of their superiors. 
55. The efforts to formalize the natural resources sector in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo are impeded mainly by the impunity enjoyed by wrongdoers, corruption 
by a range of stakeholders and loopholes in due diligence implementation.  
 
 
 A. Gold 
 
 
56. There has been little change in the gold sector since the Group’s most recent 
report (ibid., paras. 122-168). The Group welcomes the recent action taken by the 
Congolese authorities to open investigations into FARDC officers involved in illegal 
gold exploitation and fraud in South Kivu (see paras. 60 -62 below). The following 
case studies however, show that some FARDC officers and associated criminal 
networks continue to be involved in the gold sector in violation of the Mining Code 
and military regulations. 
57. In general, gold exploitation and trade remain poorly regulated, and the 
mineral is by far the most used to finance armed elements and criminal networks in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Group’s preliminary investigations 
showed that most gold produced in the country continued to be smuggled through 
neighbouring countries to Dubai, United Arab Emirates. The Group notes that, since 
the beginning of its mandate, the authorities of the United Arab Emirates have 
continued their collaboration with the Group. Unfortunately, to date, the 
recommendations made by the Group to Burundi, Uganda and the United Arab 
Emirates (see S/2016/466, para. 241) have not yet been implemented. These specific 
measures could help to reduce the quantity of illegally exported gold being sold in 
those countries. 
S/2016/1102 
 
 
16-20805 14/90 
 
58. For the present report, the Group investigated gold sourced and traded in Ituri, 
specifically in Djugu and Mambasa territories. As previously documented, armed  
groups such as the Force de résistance patriotique de l’Ituri and the remnants of 
Mai-Mai Morgan benefited from the resource through pillaging and taxation in this 
area (see ibid., paras. 128-129).  
59. The Group found that Bunia remained the main transit centre for gold 
originating from mining sites in Ituri. Négociants told the Group that they did not 
necessarily ask about the exact origin of the gold, which made it easier for 
non-conflict-free gold to enter the supply chain, often with the complicity of State 
agents. The Group notes that this is consistent with its previous findings regarding 
gold traded in Bukavu and Butembo (see ibid., para. 125). These examples 
demonstrate how formal actors, not abiding by the due diligence standards set by 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the Security 
Council and incorporated into Congolese law, can jeopardize the integrity of the 
supply chain. For this reason, the Group is concerned that the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo has not yet implemented the recommendation to 
audit comptoirs made in the previous report (see ibid., para. 238 (b)).  
 
  Actions regarding Congolese military involvement in natural resources  
 
60. The Group is aware that, in September 2016, FARDC began to investigate 
three generals and two colonels stationed in South Kivu for their alleged 
involvement in gold exploitation.7 Two of the officers were suspended during the 
investigations. Two FARDC officers told the Group in September that it was a new 
trend within the military to conduct such investigations.  
61. The Group notes that Brigadier General Espérant Hassan Masudi 
(see S/2010/596, para. 247), Colonel Samy Matumo (see S/2009/603, annex 124; 
S/2010/596, paras. 35-36 and 190-194; S/2014/42, para. 162; S/2015/19, para. 195; 
and S/2016/466, paras. 135-136) and Colonel Honoré Chiviri Hamuli 
(see S/2010/596, para. 212 and annex 40) were mentioned in previous reports for 
their involvement in the exploitation of natural resources.  
62. While the Group welcomes these efforts, a senior FARDC officer involved in 
the process told the Group in November 2016 that the investigations had already 
ended and that there would be no prosecutions. Considering the amount of 
information publicly available, including in the reports mentioned above, the Group 
is concerned that a failure by the Congolese authorities to prosecute would maintain 
a cycle of impunity and undermine efforts to put an end to the involvement of so me 
FARDC officers and criminal networks in the natural resources sector.  
 
  Colonel John Unega 
 
63. The Group’s investigations in Djugu territory showed that an FARDC colonel, 
John Unega, was involved in gold production at the Kpangba mining site near 
Mangbwalu, which is a violation of FARDC rules and article 27 of the Mining Code 
of 11 July 2002. Under both the Code and the prevailing due diligence standards, 
the involvement of army elements in mining excludes gold from being legally sold.  
__________________ 
 
7  The officers targeted by the FARDC internal investigations were Brigadier General Espérant 
Hassan Masudi, Brigadier General Gustave Safari Bwange, Brigadier General Jean -Pierre 
Molondo, Colonel Samy Matumo and Colonel Honoré Chiviri Hamuli.  
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64. A human right activist, two diggers and three Mangbwalu-based gold traders 
told the Group that Unega had been in the area for gold activities and had controlled 
a mining pit from April to July 2016, at the peak of gold production. Civil society 
actors denounced the presence of Unega and other unauthorized actors at the mining 
site (see annex 24). 
65. Four sources confirmed to the Group that they had seen uniformed FARDC 
soldiers at Unega’s pit at least once. One miner who worked for a month in the pit 
also told the Group that, during that period, Unega would visit on numerous 
occasions, sometimes in uniform, to encourage workers and provide food. The same 
source added that, upon the gold vein being struck, other FARDC elements had 
come to the site to secure the pit.  
66. The Group notes that this is not the first time that Unega has been involved in 
the exploitation of natural resources. Two FARDC officers and an ex -combatant, all 
of whom previously worked with him, told the Group about his previous 
involvement in gold in Ituri and in the timber trade in Beni territory in 2014.  
67. FARDC military justice officials issued a summons for Unega to appear at a 
hearing in June 2016 for his alleged involvement in mineral exploitation 
(see annex 25). According to two FARDC officers, an internal leak of information 
helped him to avoid being taken to the hearing.  
68. In October, the Group officially presented its findings to the Government of 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo and asked whether it was aware of Unega’s 
activities outside his area of operation. The Group had not received a response by 
the time that it submitted the present report. The Group also presented its findings 
directly to Unega by telephone while he was in Mangbwalu. He denied any 
involvement in the gold sector, saying that close relatives were involved. He also 
claimed to be unaware that he had been summonsed.  
 
  Thirty-first Brigade and Kimia Mining 
 
69. The Group has regularly reported on issues relating to the use of dredges for 
gold mining in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (see S/2015/19, 
paras. 192-193 and 225 (a), and S/2015/797, paras. 68-73). The Group found that 
the issues continued during the reporting period. Its investigations in Mambasa 
territory showed that FARDC elements from the Thirty-first Brigade had been 
deployed to protect the dredging activities of a mining company, Kimia Mining. 
Both the activities of the FARDC elements and the company were in contravention 
of Congolese law. 
70. In October 2016, the Group saw FARDC elements on a dredge exploiting gold 
in the village of Talisa, on the Ituri River, between Badengayido and Nia-Nia in 
Mambasa territory. They belonged to the Thirty-first Brigade, commanded by 
Brigadier General Muhindo Akili Mundos (see S/2016/466, paras. 198-204). Two of 
the soldiers in this brigade told the Group that about 25 of them were permanently 
present to secure the dredge exploitation of the company, allegedly owned by 
Chinese nationals. 
71. The Congolese Mining Code and military regulations forbid any FARDC 
presence at a mining site, allowing only for the presence of mining police officers 
for security. In a letter sent in October 2016, the Group asked the Government of the 
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Democratic Republic of the Congo whether the presence of elements from the 
Thirty-first Brigade was permitted, but had not received a reply by the time that it 
submitted the present report. 
72. Two FARDC military prosecutors told the Group that they were endeavouring 
to remove FARDC elements from the area, but faced opposition from the Thirty -
first Brigade leadership. 
73. The Group notes that the activities of Kimia Mining contravened the law for 
two main reasons. First, in July 2016, the Governor of Ituri suspended all dredging 
activities in the province owing to the negative effects on the environment, citing 
the Mining Code (see annex 26). The company’s use of dredges continued, however, 
after July.  
74. Second, mining officials in Mambasa and Bunia told the Group that they had 
received no statistics from Kimia Mining since it began operating there. This 
contravenes Congolese mining regulations, which require such reporting. The mining 
authorities in Bunia told the Group that two mining inspectors sent in September 2016 
to monitor the company’s activities had been refused entry to the concession.  
75. Brokers close to Kimia Mining gave the Group the names of, and 
documentation regarding, Chinese nationals who allegedly own the company. The 
Group has sought to contact them, including through the Government of China, but 
has not yet been able to do so.  
76. Two gold brokers close to Kimia Mining, a Bunia-based gold négociant and a 
mining official told the Group that the gold produced by Kimia Mining was sold in 
part to another Bunia-based négociant, Exodus Deba. In response to an official 
letter from the Group, Mr. Deba denied any business connections to Kimia Mining. 
The same sources told the Group that most of the gold production was smuggled 
through Kampala. The Group notes that such exports would be legal only if 
officially declared to the Congolese authorities.  
 
 
 B. Tin, tantalum and tungsten 
 
 
77. The Group notes that there remains only one operational due diligence system 
for tin, tantalum and tungsten in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which 
includes the ITRI Ltd Tin Supply Chain Initiative. Efforts to introduce another have 
not yet borne fruit (see S/2016/466, para. 117). 
78. As reported previously, the Group believes that, in comparison with the gold 
sector, armed elements have fewer opportunities to interfere in the tin, tantalum and 
tungsten supply chain (see ibid., para. 118). As shown in the case study below, 
however, an example of such interference exists. As previously mentioned by the 
Group, the credibility of the due diligence framework depends on companies and 
State agencies being held accountable for its implementation (see ibid., para. 119).  
79. The Group wrote in its previous report about the problem of duplication of 
some processes within the traceability/due diligence system, such as with third-
party auditing (see ibid., para. 117). The Group is aware that ITRI and the 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region have decided to work towards 
harmonizing the processes.  
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  Due diligence implementation in Masisi territory 
 
80. The Group’s investigations in Masisi territory, North Kivu, showed that some 
tin, tantalum and tungsten mining sites there were still benefiting an armed group, 
even though they had been qualified as free from armed group interference 
(“green”). 
81. In February 2016, the Ministry of Mines of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo qualified three main sites as “green” in Mahanga, 40 km west of the town of 
Masisi (see annex 27). This categorization made the cassiterite (tin) and coltan 
(tantalum) produced at the sites eligible for official export.  
82. During its visit to the area, the Group found that armed elements from an 
armed group, Guides (see annex 28), remained present at some sites. A mining actor 
and a civil society leader told the Group that those elements received money from 
the mining actors operating at the sites in Mahanga.  
83. The Group notes that, after the site was qualified as green, production 
therefrom was sold to Goma-based comptoirs. A mining official informed the Group 
that Metachem had purchased the production of the sites in question. The Group 
obtained additional documentation showing the purchase by Signal Mining of 
minerals from the sites. In November 2016, the Group wrote to all the 
aforementioned comptoirs to request detailed information about the due diligence 
policies employed to prevent armed elements from profiting from their business 
activities.  
84. The Group received responses from all the comptoirs (see, for example, annex 
29). They told the Group that they had suspended the purchase of minerals from the 
three sites. The Group is also aware that, after its letter, the ITRI Ltd Tin Supply 
Chain Initiative ceased issuing tags for minerals originating from those sites. The 
Group will continue to study this case and the responses from the comptoirs, but can 
already conclude that stakeholders cannot rely solely on validation processes or 
formal requirements to provide assurances that tin, tantalum and tungsten will be 
“conflict-free”.  
 
 
 C. Ivory 
 
 
85. The Group has previously reported on elephant poaching in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (see S/2014/42, paras. 225-238; S/2014/428, paras. 91-95; 
S/2015/19, paras. 216-223; and S/2016/466, paras. 169-181). Following its most 
recent investigation, the Group has concluded that the ivory trade offers only minimal 
financing for armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the 
Congo compared with other resources, such as gold, tin, tantalum and tungsten or 
wood products. The bulk of the revenue potential from ivory sourced in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo is for sellers in destination markets. The Lord’s 
Resistance Army (LRA) receives only 1 to 1.5 per cent of that estimated value.  
86. According to statistics from the park authorities and international conservation 
organizations for 2015, 108 elephants were poached in the Garamba Natio nal Park, 
38 in the Salonga National Park, 16 in the Virunga National Park and 5 in the Okapi 
Wildlife Reserve. The Group focused on the situation in the Garamba National Park 
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and its adjoining hunting domains, given that it was the location of more than 6 0 per 
cent of all illegal poaching incidents recorded in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo since 2003 (see annex 30).8 It is also where poaching offers a source of 
revenue for LRA. 
87. Poaching incidents in the Garamba National Park fell from the 132 reported in 
2014 to 108 in 2015. Preliminary data for 2016 show a similar pace, with 
94 elephant carcasses spotted in the first 10 months. Sources interviewed by the 
Group agree that a pair of tusks from a forest elephant in that park weighs an 
average of between 8 and 10 kg. Sources associated with the purchase of ivory from 
the park told the Group that poachers could sell ivory to middlemen for $200 per kg. 
Ivory from the 202 elephants poached in 2015 and 2016 would thus yield some 
$200,000 per year for poachers. 
88. In addition, according to data under the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the price of raw ivory reaches some 
$2,000 per kg in destination markets. In 2015 and 2016, the ivory acquired from 
poaching in the Garamba National Park would therefore have had an annual 
destination market value of up to $2 million.  
89. As previously reported, elephant poaching in the Garamba National Park is 
carried out by a range of actors, both based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and coming from neighbouring countries (see S/2014/42, paras. 228-232; S/2014/428, 
paras. 91-95; S/2015/19, paras. 219-223; and S/2016/466, paras. 179-180). Poachers 
based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo include members of local Congolese 
communities, Mbororo pastoralists9 and residual LRA elements operating in the area. 
Poachers based outside the Democratic Republic of the Congo include the Ouda 
nomadic communities10 from the Sudan and poachers from South Sudan.  
90. According to statistics from the park authorities, the local groups, including 
LRA, are responsible for 10 to 15 per cent of the poaching incidents and the foreign 
groups for 85 to 90 per cent. Those estimates are in line with information provided 
by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and from the Group’s interviews 
with combatants from the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) in 
Opposition. 
91. LRA dependants, a local chief, civil society organizations and park officials 
estimated that between 100 and 150 LRA elements were currently operating in the 
area, divided into five subgroups. They finance themselves through poaching and 
acts of violence, including roadblocks, attacks on vehicles and kidnapping for 
ransom, against the local population in Bas-Uélé and Haut-Uélé Provinces. On the 
basis of the statistics above, LRA would have derived revenue of some $20,000 to 
$30,000 per year in 2015 and 2016.  
__________________ 
 
8  According to the Garamba National Park authorities, there are some 1,300 elephants remai ning in 
the park. 
 
9  The Mbororo are originally nomadic communities of Fulani pastoralists who moved south from 
Chad during the severe droughts that affected the area in the early 2000s. The first Mbororo 
entered the Democratic Republic of the Congo in the area of Ango, Bas-Uélé Province, in 2003 
and have since settled, herding between Bas-Uélé and Haut-Uélé Provinces. 
 
10  The Ouda are nomadic communities originating from the areas between southern Libya, northern 
Chad and the Sudan, but are in general locally referred to as “Libyans”. 
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92. Park officials, international forces in the area and civil society sources told the 
Group that LRA elements and Mbororo pastoralists from Bas -Uélé Province crossed 
into the national park through the Azande hunting range, which is not intensively 
patrolled by rangers. The same sources said that the Mbororo were often taken 
hostage by LRA elements, who used them as porters and to cover their tracks among 
those left by the Mbororo animal herds, thus avoiding detection by FARDC and 
other security forces in the area.  
93. The Ouda and poachers from South Sudan can easily enter the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo illegally through the Lantoto National Park (see annex 31), a 
prolongation of the Garamba savannah in South Sudan, which is not patrolled by 
South Sudanese forces. The last of a series of clashes between Ouda poachers and 
FARDC and rangers was reported as recently as 2 October 2016 in the Azande 
hunting range. In addition, in August 2016, 900 armed elements from SPLM/A in 
Opposition crossed this border without meeting any resistance (see paras. 110 -112 
below). The elements from SPLM/A in Opposition interviewed by the Group 
confirmed that they had travelled as far as 150 km south of the border before 
encountering park rangers. 
94. The Group’s investigations show that only a small portion of ivory from 
elephants in the Garamba National Park is sold locally in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. SPLM/A in Opposition combatants and other sources familiar with 
the ivory trade told the Group that one route for ivory from the national park was 
through Juba.  
95. Another route, taken by Ouda poachers, goes to the Sudan; a GPS transmitter 
stolen by Ouda poachers after an incident with park rangers in June 2015 was traced 
to Ed Daein, the capital of East Darfur State, Sudan (see annex 32).  
96. The Group previously reported that ivory from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo had also transited through Ugandan territory to destination markets 
(see S/2014/42, para. 233, and S/2015/19, annex 67). The Group is aware that, at the 
seventeenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, held in 
Johannesburg, South Africa, from 24 September to 5 October 2016, the role of 
Uganda as an important centre in East Africa for stockpiling and exporting ivory 
originating from Central Africa was highlighted. The Ugandan authorities seized 
illegal ivory in 2015 and 2016.11 It has not been possible, however, to determine 
whether the ivory originated in the Democratic Republic of the Congo because no 
forensic analysis was available that would allow ivory seizures to be linked to 
elephant populations from the Garamba National Park (see annex 33).  
 
 
 IV. Violations of international humanitarian law 
 
 
97. The Group documented continued violations of human rights and international 
humanitarian law in the form of killings, kidnapping and destruction of property in 
Beni and Rutshuru territories, North Kivu. The Group also noted the continued use 
of children by armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
__________________ 
 
11  The Ugandan authorities declared seizures of 4 tons of ivory in 2014/15, including 700 kg in 
March 2015. The most recent seizure reported by the International Criminal Police Organization 
was in July 2016. 
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 A. Attacks on civilians in Beni territory 
 
 
98. The Group previously reported on a series of killings in Beni territory that 
began early in October 2014 (see S/2015/19, paras. 41-45; S/2015/797 paras. 84-92; 
and S/2016/466, paras. 185-197). In its previous report, the Group found that 
several armed groups had been involved, including local militias and some ADF 
factions. Since the submission of that report, in May 2016, the attacks have 
continued, some of them carried out very close to the town of Beni, a major 
population centre. While the Group’s investigation is in its preliminary stages, it is 
already clear that at least two of the recent attacks were carried out by ADF 
combatants under the leadership of Seka Baluku (see paras. 31 -43 above). 
 
  Baluku group attacks near Oicha 
 
99. Two former ADF combatants, who had been based in Madina II and Miba and 
identified their leader as Seka Baluku, told the Group that their faction had been 
responsible for two attacks near Oicha, 23 km north of the town of Beni.  
100. The first attack was in the early morning of 5 July 2016 in Tenambo, 2 km 
from the centre of Oicha, where nine civilians were killed. According to the 
ex-combatants, their goal was to find supplies, including flour, medicine and 
cooking oil. Some among them fired in the air so that people would flee and make  it 
easier for them to loot the houses.  
101. The second attack was just over three weeks later, on 30 July, again in 
Tenambo. In this case, both FARDC and MONUSCO forces engaged the attackers, 
but two civilians were killed. The same ADF combatants told the Group that, again, 
their goal had been to find supplies, especially medicine and salt.  
102. The Group notes that the two attacks were focused primarily on acquiring 
supplies, with the number of civilians killed in both cases being lower than in some 
of the attacks in which pillaging of supplies was not reported. One of the latter 
examples was the attack on Rwangoma, a neighbourhood in the town of Beni. 
Although the Group is not yet able to attribute responsibility for the attack, it was 
the deadliest incident during the period under review and serves as a case study of a 
different style of attack to the two above (see annex 34).  
 
 
 B. Intercommunal violence in Rutshuru territory 
 
 
103. In its previous report, the Group described the increasing intercommunal  
tensions in southern Lubero territory, North Kivu, that were leading to violence and 
the displacement of the local population (see S/2016/466, paras. 75-80 and 214-
218). In the period under review, these dynamics spread into Rutshuru territory with 
similar consequences. The violence was in part enabled by the changing power 
dynamics, with FDLR and its Nyatura allies losing unchallenged control over the 
area as a result of attacks by other armed groups, such as NDC-R and Mai-Mai 
Mazembe. 
104. In July 2016, civil society organizations reported at least 93 civilian deaths 
between Nyanzalé and Kibirizi owing to fighting between communities, each 
represented by its affiliated armed groups (see annex 35). The fighting also led to 
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significant population displacement and the destruction of hundreds of houses. The 
Group found that Nyatura factions, FDLR, NDC-R and Mai-Mai Mazembe12 were 
all involved in the killing of civilians.  
105. The first major attack took place on 7/8 July 2016, when Mai-Mai Mazembe 
and NDC-R attacked Kikuku. Over the following week, a local civil society 
organization registered the deaths of at least 73 members of the Hutu community in 
Kikuku and the nearby villages of Kiyeye, Kitunda and Mutanda (see annex 36), 
areas formerly in the FDLR sphere of influence. This prompted a violent response 
from local young people and at least one Nyatura faction, who attacked Kikuku and 
Bwalanda. 
106. The subsequent wave of attacks was perpetrated largely by Nyatura groups 
with some support from FDLR. Former combatants under the command of John 
Love and Domi told the Group of their involvement in the attacks, including that on 
Kibirizi on 17/18 July 2016. Local civil society organizations registered the deaths 
of 20 members of the Hunde and Nande communities in the second half of July. 
Early in August, these attacks and reprisals culminated in widespread incidents of 
arson in Nyanzalé and surrounding villages.  
107. In response to the situation, the FARDC Sukola II commander, Brigadier 
General Bruno Mandevu, went to Nyanzalé personally in mid -August, with FARDC 
reinforcements. The situation stabilized soon thereafter, but the axis remained 
largely segregated along community lines, with small-scale attacks again on the rise 
in October 2016. 
 
 
 V. Arms 
 
 
108. Since the beginning of its mandate, the Group has investigated a range of 
potential arms embargo violations, including arms and ammunition recovered from 
armed groups operating in the eastern Democratic Republic of the  Congo. The 
Group also found that combatants from SPLM/A in Opposition entered the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo with military equipment in August 2016 in 
violation of the embargo. 
109. The Group notes that, in paragraph 18 of its resolution 2293 (2016), the 
Security Council called upon the Government of the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo to continue to improve its stockpile security and management of materiel, as 
well as to implement a national weapons-marking programme. While the Group is 
aware of various projects in this direction, the overall progress has been minimal. 
The Group is concerned that the risk remains high of continued diversion of 
government stocks to armed groups, as previously documented (see S/2012/843, 
para. 139; S/2015/797, para. 46; and S/2016/466, para. 229).  
 
 
__________________ 
 
12  Mai-Mai Mazembe is a highly decentralized armed movement, and the name is increasingly used 
by various other small local groups.  
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 A. Embargo violations 
 
 
  Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition 
 
110. On 17 August 2016, soldiers loyal to the former Vice-President of South 
Sudan, Riek Machar Teny, crossed from South Sudan into the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo with arms and ammunition. They entered the Garamba National Park 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after fighting broke out as a result of a 
disagreement over the implementation of the peace agreement signed in August 
2015. The Group notes that the presence of such combatants with arms and 
ammunition on Congolese territory is a violation of Security Council resolution 
2293 (2016). 
111. The Group interviewed two SPLM/A in Opposition generals and three other 
officers after their arrival in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. They claimed 
that 1,307 armed men had been sent to ensure the protection of Machar when he 
returned to Juba in April 2016, pursuant to the peace agreement. They claimed that 
all had been armed with AK-47 rifles and that their weapons had included 
35 machine guns and 35 RPG-7 grenade launchers. They said that the fighting that 
had broken out in Juba on 7 July 2016 had forced some 900 of them to cross  into the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.  
112. In August 2016, MONUSCO extracted 755 of the SPLM/A in Opposition 
combatants with 138 weapons. The Group notes the discrepancy between the 
number of weapons potentially brought into the Democratic Republic o f the Congo 
and the number recovered and will continue to investigate whether additional 
combatants or materiel remain at large in Congolese territory.  
 
  Arms and ammunition recovered from armed groups  
 
113. The Group documented and began to trace a wide variety of arms and 
ammunition potentially acquired or transferred in violation of the arms embargo 
(see annex 37). It found that some batches of ammunition were especially prevalent 
and used by various armed groups operating in disparate geographical areas 
(see annex 38). There is no indication that this materiel was transferred directly 
from the countries of origin to the armed groups active in the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo in violation of the embargo. Rather, the Group is seeking to investigate 
the possibility that the materiel was diverted to a third party after its original legal 
sale. 
 
 
 B. Stockpile management 
 
 
114. As previously reported, the Group continues to be concerned by deficiencies in 
stockpile management and the weapons-marking and weapons-registration system 
within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which makes it difficult to track 
weapons that are diverted from government stocks to armed groups 
(see S/2012/843, para. 139; S/2014/42, para. 128; S/2015/19, para. 154; and 
S/2016/466, para. 220). The Group found that these same issues remained during the 
reporting period. 
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115. United Nations and government sources told the Group that storage facilities 
remained inadequate and, in some cases, represented a threat to the safety and 
security of the population. The Mine Action Service told the Group that it had 
identified and destroyed ammunition in various locations in South Kivu in 2016 that 
posed a danger (see annex 39). 
116. The Mine Action Service and its partners are constructing eight new armouries 
for the Congolese National Police in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri and installing 
weapons safes in various locations for a range of national security services. Similar 
projects would need to be expanded to address the needs of the security services 
throughout the country. 
117. The Group also followed up on the weapons-marking programme being 
carried out by the National Commission for the Control of Small Arms and Light 
Weapons. The Commission currently has five marking machines and the goal of 
marking 2,000 weapons per month. The Group found, however, that only two of the 
machines were in use, with weapons being marked only in Kinshasa.  
118. With an estimated 300,000 small arms to be marked in the country, many of 
which are outside the capital, the current capacity is inadequate to address the issue 
in a timely manner. 
 
 
 VI. Recommendations 
 
 
119. The Group makes the recommendations set out below.  
 
  Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo  
 
120. The Group recommends that the Government of the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo:  
 (a) Investigate, and prosecute as appropriate, FARDC officers involved in 
natural resources exploitation, and continue the investigations relating to the 
officers in South Kivu (see paras. 60-76); 
 (b) Ensure compliance with mining regulations that apply to dredges, and 
investigate the activities of Kimia Mining on the Ituri River (see paras. 69 -76); 
 (c) Expand beyond Kinshasa activities to mark the small arms and light 
weapons of the government security forces (see paras. 117 -118);  
 (d) Identify and destroy those munitions in storage that have deteriorated 
and therefore pose a danger to the population (see paras. 114 -116). 
 
  Governments of regional States 
 
121. The Group recommends that the Governments of Burundi, the Central African 
Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, 
Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania collect samples from any ivory seized 
in their territories and provide them to forensic and research institutions to establish 
their origin, including by using existing DNA databases (see para. 96).  
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Annex 1: FDLR press release regarding the creation of the CNRD 
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Annex 2: The creation of the CNRD 
 
COMMUNIQUÉ ADRESSÉ À TOUS LES RWANDAIS PARTOUT OU ILS SONT ET CEUX QUI 
MILITENT POUR LA PAIX, L’UNION ET LA DEMOCRATIE 
On a constaté que notre lutte de ramener les refugies dans la dignité et lutter pour un changement dans 
notre pays n’est plus possible si nous continuons d’être distrait par le Gen. Byiringiro Victor, qui a été 
caractérisé par ces qui suit dans sa gouvernance : 
- Il prend des décisions intempestives sans consulter le comité ou au mépris des conseils donnés par 
le comité 
- Le mépris des décisions pris dans l’assemblée 
- Donner une mauvaise image de notre comité en méprisant le gouvernement du pays d’accueil ; la 
RDC et le HCR dans son travail de décompté les refugies rwandais qui sont sur le sol congolais en 
tirant sur le HCR/CNR en date du 15/04/2016 a BWERU en tuant, pillant les biens du haut conseil 
et de la population  
- Prendre en otage les réfugiés en les interdisant de s’identifier, se faire protéger et recevoir l’aide 
de la communauté internationale en faisant d’eux le bouclier humain  
- Travailler avec les ennemies du comité en favorisant les arrestations, les tueries d’une partie des 
refugies et en favorisant le retour forcé des autres 
- Bloquer expressément le comité depuis 2004 en favorisant la division au sein des comités (RUD, 
CMC) 
- Il a été caractérisé par un manque de gestion rationnel des dossiers de négociations (ex  : ROME, 
NTOTO et dossier cantonnement) 
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- Une gestion calamiteuse des ressources du partie sans objectif  
- Refus de collaborer avec les autres dans l’effort de faciliter le retour des refugies dans la dignité et 
en bloquant ou en détruisant les efforts (ex : CPC et FCL UNION) 
- Manque d’expérience politique et diplomatique 
- Favoriser le tribalisme et le régionalisme 
En se basant sur ces raisons énumérer ci-haut, nous concluons qu’il ne pourra pas arrive aux objectifs 
poursuivis par les rwandais en général et les refugies en particulier et nous prenons les décisions 
suivantes : 
 On se sépare du Gen Maj. BYIRINGIRO VICTOR et son FDLR ainsi que son amateurisme dans la 
direction de la partie 
 On décide de mettre en place un comité national pour le changement et la démocratie dans l’unité  
du Rwanda, CRND-UBWIYUNGE (CONSEIL national pour le renouveau et la démocratie) en 
sigle 
 Notre objectif principal est de rapatrier nos refugies qui continues à souffrir dans les forêts dans la 
dignité et rentrée dans leurs pays d’origine et unifie tous les rwandais en général. Cet objectif est 
construit sur dans les objectifs suivants : 
o Lutter pour les droits des refugies et leur rapatriement dans la dignité  
o Lutter pour le changement dans notre pays 
o Lutter pour la mettre à nu la vérité sur le génocide au Rwanda, pour que la justice 
poursuive ceux qui ont commis ces massacres et innocenter ceux qui ont été jugé 
innocemment qu’on ne peut citer ici ; 
o Lutter pour l’union des rwandais, construire et développer une économie dans le pays  ; 
o Lutter pour la paix et la diplomatie entre notre pays et nos pays voisins ainsi que tous les 
autres pays 
o Lutter pour la mise en place d’un pouvoir qui prend en compte des droits internationaux 
qu’est : un pays qui respecte la constitution, la démocratie, le pluralisme politique,  vote 
non forcés et la beauté de la république (le pays de tous) 
Pour atteindre nos objectifs, nous demandons aux rwandais et rwandaise qui aime leurs pays aussi tout 
le monde qui aime et lutte pour la paix, la démocratie et l’union, de nous soutenir avec les conseils et 
dans les actions constructives. 
L’union fait la force et Dieu aide ceux qui s’unissent 
Fait à Kigali, le 31 mai 2016 
KAMUHANDA ANASTAS, 
Le porte-parole du CNRD UBUMWE  
Tel : +243841023051 / +243813629654 
 
 
(Translation from Kinyarwanda by the Group; accessed 1 Aug 2016 at http://www.veritasinfo.fr/2016/05/rwanda-
bamwe-mubitandukanyije-na-fdlr-bashinze-umutwe-mushya-witwa-cnrd-ubwiyunge.html)  
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Annex 3: FDLR orders regarding biometric registration 
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Documents recovered by MONUSCO  (June 2016) / annotations by the Group  
 
  
 
S/2016/1102 
 
31/90 16-20805 
 
Annex 4: FDLR list of officers joining the CNRD 
The FDLR presidency provided the names of 46 officers they officially recognized as having deserted 
their armed group to join the CNRD as of 30 September 2016.  
 
Bde Gen Gaseni 
Col Irategeka Wilson 
Col Hamada 
Col Shemeki 
Col Job Kuramba 
Col Fred 
Col Abdallah Come 
Col Josué Hakizimana 
 
Lt Col Morane (aka Sinayobje Barnabé) 
Lt Col Antoine Jeva 
Lt Col Marc 
Lt Col Musana Archeveque 
Lt Col Ave Maria Gathos 
Lt Col Moro Morice 
Lt Col Tchishambongo 
Lt Col Ndoli Cyitatire 
 
Maj Engambi Yamusimba 
Maj Juliano Staline 
Maj Marcel Ibuguma 
Maj Javel 
Maj Beau-Fils 
Maj Juventus 
Maj Gonzaga Gonzague 
Maj Artemon 
Maj John Diego 
Maj Kidado 
Maj Magabe 
Maj Memukane 
Maj Maisha Théoneste 
 
Capt Akbar 
Capt Foestus 
Capt Kalimir 
 
Lt Adolphe 
Lt Peter 
Lt Kamambure Damascène 
Lt Mukubwa 
Lt Belky 
Lt Enius 
Lt Muhutu 
Lt Gbado 
Lt Clément Masamba 
Lt BNB 
Lt Okambi S Patrick 
Lt Amuza 
Lt Manudi 
 
2Lt Tsunami 
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Annex 5: FDLR restructuring and hierarchy 
Continuous military pressure, arrests and defections forced the FDLR to restructure their armed wing 
in late October 2016. Having lost their entire operational sector in South Kivu to the CNRD, the North 
Kivu operational sector and its reserve subsector were also dissolved. The high command now directly 
oversees four units: two operational subsectors, the specialized Commando de Recherche et d’Action 
en Profondeur (CRAP) units and the training schools. 
Except for the suspension of former Second Vice President Ndagijimana, the FDLR’s political 
leadership remained the same (see S/2016/466, annex 6). Sanctioned individuals Iyamuremye and 
Callixte Mbarushimana retained their posts as First Vice-President and Executive Secretary, 
respectively. The Group notes that both continue to be involved as key decision-makers. 
 Table compiled by the Group based on interviews with current and former FDLR combatants (November 2016)  
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Annex 6: FARDC Sukola II statistics 
Document provided by the FARDC (November 2016)  
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Annex 7: MONUSCO demobilization statistics for the FDLR 
Statistics provided by MONUSCO (October 2016)  
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Annex 8: FDLR locations in Rutshuru territory  
Map by the Group (November 2016)  
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Annex 9: Orders by Mudacumura to employ guerrilla warfare 
Documents recovered by MONUSCO (June 2016) / annotations by the Group 
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Annex 10: Recruitment, defections and acquisition of materiel 
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Documents recovered by MONUSCO (June 2016) / annotations by the Group 
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Annex 11: FDLR military training I 
In May 2016, FDLR’s Subsector Sinai organized a four-week training for 24 recruits. Each unit was 
tasked to submit as many recruits as possible as well as to finance each recruit with $5 for the training 
period. A list of instructors was also provided. The four-week program included training modules on 
arms, internal rules, ideology and first aid. The results obtained in the final tests were meticulously 
noted and a “graduation” ceremony was organized, including the announcement of the training results.  
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Documents recovered by MONUSCO (June 2016)  
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Annex 12: FDLR military training II 
   Documents recovered by MONUSCO (June 2016)  
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Annex 13: FDLR Chypre Company effectives and materiel 
Graphic by the Group (November 2016)  
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    Documents recovered by MONUSCO (June 2016) / annotations by the Group 
 
 
  
 
S/2016/1102 
 
47/90 16-20805 
 
  Annex 14: Revenue generation in FDLR Chypre Company 
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Documents recovered by MONUSCO (June 2016) / annotations by the Group 
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  Annex 15: CNRD press release 002/CP/16 
 
 
The National Council for Renewal and Democracy (CNRD-Ubwiyunge) is horrified by the misinformation 
circulating on social media including the website "www.direct.cd" which wrote in in its published article that 
CNRD-UBWIYUNGE is a movement seeking to destabilize peace in Democratic Republic of Congo. 
The CNRD-UBWIYUNGE has taken this opportunity to inform the public, the Congolese people and the 
international community that this information is groundless. Indeed, the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE was found on 
31, May 2016 by Rwandan refugees in Democratic Republic of Congo and around the world. The objectives of 
the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE includes the following:  
1. Plead the cause of the Rwandan refugees. Throughout the world but especially those located in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. You will notice that CNRD-Ubwiyunge works closely with the 
Democratic Republic of Congo government institutions, UNHCR, humanitarian NGOs, and many other 
organisations to ensure that our refugee population are: 
   A. Recognize 
   B. Secured and protected  
   C. Receiving Humanitarian Assistance. 
2. Return dignity to all Rwandan Refugees. We this by working with other opposition parties to pressure the 
RPF-Inkotanyi regime to open political space and is committed to the path of dialogue with the real 
political opposition. 
3. Create true reconciliation between the ethnic that make up the Rwandan Society. Here we fight all forms of 
impunity and advocate for a Rwandan society where everyone is equal before the law. 
The above mentioned evidence, concludes that, the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE has no territorial ambition in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Instead, it intends to offer its experience to build an enduring peace in the 
Great Lakes region of Africa, through legal and political means under the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. 
Information linking the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE to those who want to destabilize the peace of the Congolese 
people within harmful propaganda orchestrated by the detractors of the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE. We strongly 
disagree and we against those lies that are being circulating on social media. 
The authors of this article which was published in ‘Direct.Cd’ should exercise intellectual, honesty and seek 
information from the concerned individuals rather than doing a propagandist press. 
Done at Rutchuru, June 26, 2016 
For the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE 
Barnabas Sinayobye 
Spokesman of the CNRD-UBWIYUNGE (Sé) 
Telephone: +243842543221 / + 243824804184 
(Press release accessed on 1 August 2016 at http://bihibindinews.blogspot.com/2016/06/cnrd-ubwiyungu-does-not-have-
any.html)   
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  Annex 16: CNRD leadership and the FLN military hierarchy 
 
 
Table compiled by the Group based on interviews with current and former CNRD/FLN combatants (November 2016) 
 
CNRD political leadership 
President: NDAGIJIMANA Laurent, aka IRATEGEKA Wilson, Rumbago 
Executive Secretary: NYAWENDA Jean-Marie, aka MUKIZA David 
Defense Commissioner: Bde Gen NIYIRORA Eliezer, aka Eli Hadji 
Deputy Defense Commissioner: Col MUGABONAKE Boniface, aka HAGENIMANA Josué, Bony 
Information Commissioner and Spokesperson: Lt Col SINAYOBYE Barnabé, aka Morane 
Humanitarian Affairs Commissioner: KAMUHANDA Anastase 
Commissioner for Women’s Issues: MUKASINE Espérance 
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  Annex 17: Bunkers in Madina II 
 
 
The FARDC discovered a system of bunkers in the three ADF camps that made up Madina II. ADF combatants 
in those camps told the Group the bunkers were dug to protect them against aerial attacks and to hide from 
MONUSCO’s unmanned aerial vehicles. 
 
Photos by the FARDC (May 2016) 
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  Annex 18: Select ADF camp locations 
 
 
The camp complexes mentioned most often by ex-combatants from the ADF group under Seka Baluku were 
Madina II and Miba, shown below. 
Map by the Group (November 2016)  
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  Annex 19: ADF documents regarding camp regulations 
 
 
The document below shows the official statements taken by the representative of the ADF’s internal security 
(II) in Camp Whisper in August 2016 after the alleged failure of two girls to follow orders. The II agent notes 
his previous experience on the ADF general court, “High Court A” (see S/2015/19, annex 9), and that the 
general punishment for this infraction was time in jail. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONT C 
08/09/016 
Hadiji Namukwaya, 14 yrs old 
She is accused of not going to the village (questions we 
asked her) 
Q. Why didn’t you go to the village?  
A. I was hungry. 
Q. When we were at Suuloli, did you tell anyone that 
you were hungry? 
A. I didn’t tell anyone. 
Q. Is that the only reason that stopped you [from going 
to the village]? 
A. I also didn’t have clothes. I would have returned to 
the village with nothing to wear. 
Q. Is that all? 
A. Yes. 
 
Fatuma Mukwaya, 12 yrs old 
She is accused of not going to the village 
Q. Why didn’t you go to the village? 
A. I am sick. My legs and chest hurt. 
Q. Do you have a letter from the health worker that 
permits you not to go to the village? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you go to the health worker for treatment? 
A. No.  
NB: I settled cases (in High Court A) of people who 
refused to go to the village. When found guilty, you are 
put in jail until the village decides [the prisoners] can 
be released and can go back and bring food for 
Abush/Uimma.  
                           [signed] II Whisper 
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The two documents below demonstrate the severity of punishments given out. Spreading a rumor was punished 
with 60 lashes; causing a commotion, fighting, and extending destruction were punished with 200 lashes; and 
500 lashes were given for a crime that was detailed on a missing page.  
Other crimes mentioned in additional documents included: leaving a camp without permission, making a fire in 
the morning, being lazy, talking nonsense, speaking about things other than the job at hand, disobeying orders, 
causing chaos, leaving a place of worship without notifying anyone, talking while preaching is going on, 
sleeping while on watch, and talking badly about a co-wife. 
 
 Cases in the village 
Ejakaiti took people to the 
village and told them to wait 
there and he would return. 
They left after they got 
food. 
Decision: both sides were 
found guilty. 
 
Penalty 
- Eriya was sentenced to 
200 flogs after he caused 
commotion in the village. 
- Amiri Maribu was also 
sentenced to 200 flogs for 
fighting 
 
 
 
What is not accepted 
nowadays 
He was then sentenced to 
500 strokes. 
Mama Haula was accused of 
spreading rumors about 
someone and was found 
guilty. She was sentenced to 
60 strokes. 
Habaibu and Manisuli were 
accused of extending 
destruction. They were later 
found guilty and sentence to 
200 strokes plus jail time. 
Documents recovered by the FARDC / translations by the UN Secretariat  
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  Annex 20: ADF documents regarding religion in Madina II 
 
Prohibition of a number of needless matters  
 
Abu Hurayrah relates the following:  
 
The Messenger of God said: God finds pleasing three 
things for you and has prohibited (or “abhors” or 
“despises”) three things for you. He is pleased when you 
worship Him Alone, refuse to associate anything with 
Him and hold fast to the rope of God without becoming 
divided. He despises when you engage in idle chatter, ask 
excessive questions and squander wealth. (Related by 
Muslim in his Sahih.) 
 
  
 
You alone we worship, and we beseech You not to leave 
us alone. Preserve us from the evils of the polytheists, for 
You are the best Preserver and you are the Most Merciful 
of the merciful. O He Who Answers, we call on You by 
your beautiful names as You commanded us, so answer us 
as You promised, for You do not renege on Your promises. 
Deliver us from the grievous affliction in which we find 
ourselves, for You are truly a wondrous Answerer.  
 
-- O God, You wrote in the Psalms after the previous 
revelation that Your upright servants shall inherit the 
earth. 
-- O God, the religion is Yours, and we are Your servants. 
The earth is Yours, to bequeath to whom You will of your 
servants, and the best outcome is for the righteous. 
-- We beseech You to bequeath to us this earth that we 
may serve You and proclaim Your oneness, worship none 
but You, enjoin good and proscribe evil, perform prayer, 
and give charity. To God is the outcome of all things.  
-- We beseech You, our Lord, to make us successors on 
earth as You made successors of those who came before 
us, that You empower for us Your religion 
Documents recovered by the FARDC / translation by the UN Secretariat   
S/2016/1102 
 
 
16-20805 56/90 
 
  Annex 21: Nyatura groups in Masisi and Rutshuru territories in 
North Kivu province 
 
 
In November 2016, a number of armed groups using the umbrella term “Nyatura” were active in North 
Kivu province. The first armed groups with this name emerged in 2011 (see S/2011/738, paras. 325 -
327) in response to perceived threats by former CNDP officers integrated into the FARDC and 
deployed in Masisi and Rutshuru territories.  
In recent years, Nyatura groups sometimes fought with the FARDC (e.g. against M23, see S/2012/843, 
paras. 120-125), were involved in wider issues of land conflict and local political power, benefited from 
3T exploitation (see S/2012/843, paras. 179 and 240) and – more recently – were involved in the 
conflict between the FDLR and the CNRD. Nyatura have also been known to have a high number of 
children in their ranks (see S/2015/19, paras. 128-130, and S/2014/42, paras. 158-160). 
Some Nyatura factions came out of earlier armed mobilisations, such as the Mutuelle des Agriculteurs 
de Virunga (MAGRIVI), the Combattants, Mai Mai Mongol and PARECO. Others emerged in response 
to dynamics like the emergence of M23. The latter was one of two peak mobilization periods for 
Nyatura groups. The other is the current period under review.  
Of the various Nyatura leaders currently active, at least Kasongo, Kigingi and Kalume have been active 
in armed group leadership for several years. The table below lists the factions the Group was able to 
identify during the period under review: 
Alias Name Leader Area 
Nyatura Domi-FPC Forces de Patriotes Congolais Ndaruhutse Kamanzi Bukombo 
Nyatura John Love John Love Muhawenimana Bunombe Kihondo 
Nyatura Tujigemee Raia Tujigemee - - 
Nyatura FDDH Forces de Défense des Droits Humains Kasongo Kalamo Bashali 
Nyatura JED Justice et Egalité pour la Démocratie  Bavakure Bashali 
Nyatura Jean-Marie - Jean-Marie Bashali 
Nyatura Bigirabagabo Groupe de Sécurité (with FDDH) Bigirabagabo Bashali 
Nyatura APRDC 
Alliance des Patriotes pour la 
Réstauration de la Démocratie au Congo 
Benjamin Bashali 
Nyatura MRCCV 
Mouvement de Résidents Congolais pour 
un Changement Vital 
Kigingi Machokotala Nyamaboko 
Nyatura Kalume - Matias Kalume Kage Ufamandu 
   Table by the Group based on interviews and documentary evidence (November 2016) 
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  Annex 22: Selected positions of Nyatura John Love 
 
Map by the Group (November 2016)  
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Annex 23: Bashali chiefdom disarmament ceremony 
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Photo by the Group (August 2016)   
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Annex 24: Civil society denunciation of illegal gold exploitation in 
Kpangba 
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Annex 25: Summons for Colonel Unega 
 
Photo by the Group (August 2016)   
S/2016/1102 
 
 
16-20805 66/90 
 
Annex 26: Dredge mining suspension in Ituri province 
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Photo by the Group (October 2016)   
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Annex 27: Mine validation in Masisi territory 
 
 
 
Photos and annotation by the Group (October 2016)   
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Annex 28: The armed groups known as the Guides 
 
 
The Guides were created in late 2011 when a group of Congolese combatants participated in the killing 
of several key FDLR officers (see S/2012/348, paras. 37-38 and 47-48). Originally led by “General” 
Charles Butu Luanda, this militia underwent a series of splits and restructurings. Luanda’s faction later 
took the name Forces de Défense du Congo (FDC), another faction – led by commanders Bwira and 
Mbura – referred to themselves as Guides-Mouvement acquis au Changement (MAC). Both factions 
used to operate in and around the two Nyamaboko groupings and in Waloalungu. More recently, 
Luanda lost part of his group to a split led by “Colonel” Tumisifu, who also has ties to “General” 
Janvier’s APCLS. 
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Annex 29: Response from Signal Mining 
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Published with the permission of Signal Mining  
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Annex 30: Elephant populations in and around Garamba National 
Park 
 
 
Established in 1938, Garamba National Park (GNP) is one of Africa’s oldest parks. Situated in Haut 
Uélé province, the park covers 4,900 square kilometers and is adjoined by three hunting domains: 
Azande (west), Gangala na Bodio (south) and Mondo Missa (east). The park and the three hunting 
domains form the Garamba complex, which covers a total area of 12,500 square kilometers. To the 
north, the GNP shares a 200-kilometer-long border with South Sudan’s Lantoto Park.  
A UNESCO Word Heritage site since 1980, Garamba has been inscribed since 1996 in the 
Organization’s List of World Heritage in Danger, mainly due to the high levels of poaching, which 
decimated Garamba’s elephant population from 22,000 in the 1970s to 1,300 in 2016 and brought the 
white rhinoceros and Kordofan giraffe to the brink of extinction.  
 
Graph by the Group based on historical data (November 2016)  
 
 
Historic census of selected fauna in Garamba  
 1976 1984 1995 2000 2007 2012 2014 2016 
Elephant 22,670 3,300 11,175 6,022 3,696 1,629 1,718 1,300 
Giraffe 350 237 178 118 82 11 42 37 
 
Chart by the Group based on information from Garamba and UNESCO  
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Annex 31: Garamba observation points and surveillance routes  
 
 
Since 2015, Garamba National Park (GNP) authorities have managed to increase aerial and ground 
surveillance north of the Garamba River, covering almost 100 percent of the total park. Patrols and 
surveillance in the adjoining hunting domains have also increased, although no buffer zone exists yet 
between the park, which has very strictly regulated access, and the hunting domains where human 
settlement, hunting, logging and artisanal mining activities are permitted. 
In the south and east, the hunting domains of Gangala na Bodio and Mondo Missa are highly affected 
by anthropic activities, especially artisanal mining, which resulted in dense human settlement. The 
mining town of Sambia, for example, hosts some 20,000 people. While human settlement there is not a 
threat to the park per se, especially if local populations are properly sensitized, the increasing need for 
food and income makes it more likely that individuals will begin poaching in the park. The illicit trade 
in unregulated minerals could also provide networks for the trafficking of ivory.  
 
 
Map by the Group based on information from Garamba National Park and UNESCO. The extended surveillance 
in Garamba National Park started in 2015; Garamba River was previously the limit of patrols.   
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Annex 32: Tracking device from a GPS device stolen from a Garamba  
park ranger 
 
 
In June 2015, Ouda poachers killed a Garamba park ranger and stole his GPS device. That device was 
then tracked (in white below), showing movement from outskirts of the Azande hunting domain up to 
Sudan’s East Darfur region, near the capital of El Daein. The last data was received on 29 September 
2016. 
Map by the Group (November 2016)  
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Annex 33: CITES provisions on sampling of seized ivory specimens 
 
 
The seventeenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of wild fauna and flora (CITES), held in Johannesburg from 24 September to  
5 October 2016, named Hong Kong SAR, Malaysia, Singapore and Viet Nam as “countries of concern” 
for their role as international ivory market hubs and China as “continuing to be a major destination for 
illicit ivory”. Kenya and Tanzania were mentioned as markets from which most of the ivory was 
illegally shipped to international markets since 2009. Uganda was named as an “important 
entrepôt/export centre in East Africa with clear links to Central African ivory trade flows”.1 
CITES Resolution Conf. 10.10 (amended at the 16th Conference of Parties) “Trade in elephant 
specimens”, urged Parties to collect samples from large-scale ivory seizures (500 kilograms or more) in 
their territories and to provide these to relevant forensic and research institutions in support of 
enforcement and prosecutions. It furthermore encouraged the sharing of forensic samples and data, 
including through existing DNA databases.2 
Examples of currently available forensic analysis include microsatellite DNA and mitochondrial DNA 
sampling, which allow for cross-checking DNA of seized ivory with that of living elephant populations 
in order to ascertain the origin of the sample. Another forensic analysis tool developed by some 
laboratories relies on isotope fingerprinting similar to that in use in the minerals sector, which allows 
for the detection of traces of carbon and nitrogen isotopes in ivory samples. While these methods vary 
in cost, turnover time and availability, maps for African elephants based on such analyses already exist 
and allow for the identification of elephant populations within a 200 kilometre radius. Since most 
elephant populations living in Garamba move inside such a radius, this sampling would almost 
unambiguously reveal whether ivory seized in DRC and neighbouring countries originated from 
elephants poached in the GNP. 
 
 
 
  
__________________ 
 
1
 https://cites.org/sites/default/files/eng/cop/17/WorkingDocs/E -CoP17-57-06-R1.pdf, last 
accessed on 03 November 2016. 
 
2
 https://cites.org/eng/res/10/10-10R16.php. 
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Annex 34: Rwangoma massacre 
 
 
On the evening of 13 August 2016, individuals armed with machetes, axes and Kalashnikov-pattern 
rifles moved west through Mangolikene to Rwangoma on the eastern edge of Beni town, killing at least 
36 civilians along the way. The Group reached the site two days after the incident, which allowed for 
the collection of significant direct evidence and eye-witness testimony. The investigation is ongoing, 
however, and the Group is not yet prepared to attribute the killing to a specific armed group.  
As has been the case in the Group’s investigations of similar killings in this area, eye -witness testimony 
was widely divergent and contradictory. Some witnesses claimed the assailants were all men wearing 
clean FARDC uniforms and speaking Lingala. Others claimed the assailants included women and 
children, all wearing traditional Muslim clothing and speaking foreign-accented Swahili or a language 
they couldn’t identify. Others claimed the assailants wore black uniforms. Divergent accounts of 
traumatic events are to be expected, but the level of variation in this case is problematic, since some of 
the eyewitnesses saw the assailants close-up and in broad daylight. 
The Group found direct physical evidence that showed the route the assailants took through 
Mangolikene and Mbelu, east of Beni town, the location of their camp the night after the killings, and 
the way in which certain victims were killed. The poor security situation in those areas directly after the 
attacks kept residents away from the area and preserved the scene until the Group arrived. In some 
cases, the Group found bodies right where they had been killed. 
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The Group confirmed 36 deaths, 33 by sharp force injuries consistent with an axe or machete and three 
by gunshot. In some cases, there was evidence that victims had been tied up before they were killed. In 
other cases, victims were killed while attempting to flee. The true number of victims is likely higher 
than 36, as sources told the Group of additional bodies found and buried in the forest after the initial 
investigation.  
FARDC leadership told the Group they were first made aware of the incursion after most of the killings 
had already taken place. Certain local residents, however, showed the Group outgoing calls and text 
messages to FARDC officers, alerting them to the movement of suspected ADF members towards this 
area several hours before the killing began. While this does not necessarily suggest any complicity on 
the part of the FARDC, it does demonstrate the inability of Congolese security forces to effectively 
defend the civilian population, even in close vicinity to major population centres.  
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Annex 35: Map of selected Rutshuru locations 
 
 
Map by the Group (November 2016)  
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Annex 36: Civilians killed around Kikuku and Nyanzale 
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Document produced by members of the civil society (September 2016)  
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Annex 37: Arms recovered from armed groups 
 
 
The Group has begun tracing arms and ammunition recovered from armed groups in the eastern DRC.  
VZ-59 with characteristics similar to those produced in the Czech Republic  
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Serial Number S-50792   Serial Number V-60116 
Year of production 1963   Year of production 1964 
 
Materiel with characteristics similar to that produced in the People’s Republic of China 
60 mm mortar bombs 
1_12_313 2012 
 
8_10_9613 
Model DPS/PP93-60 
2010 
 
 
Fuses for mortar bombs 
3_11_9324 
Model MP-5E 
2011 
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4_11_9324 
Model MJ-7 
2011 
 
03_07_9324 
Model M-6 
2007 
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Cartridges for mortar bombs 
937_06 2006 
 
937_08 2008 
 
937_10 2010 
 
937_11 2011 
 
9613_10 2010 
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Materiel with characteristics similar to that produced in the Sudan  
60mm Mortar « Nimir » 
 
 
  
  Serial number “3372” on the tube  
  
  Serial number “3454” on the base plate and “2007” as the year of fabrication  
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PG 7 
Factory 
code 
Year of 
production 
Picture 
2_12_23 
Model 
DZGI-40 
2012 
 
 
Materiel with characteristics similar to those used by the Ugandan military 
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Annex 38: Ammunition headstamps documented with numerous armed groups 
Armed groups Head stamp 
Characteristics similar to those 
produced in 
3 
10_87 Bulgaria 
61_97 People’s Republic of China 
61_92 People’s Republic of China 
71_97 People’s Republic of China 
811_08 People’s Republic of China 
964_71 People’s Republic of China 
711_75 Former USSR 
270_51 Former USSR (Ukraine) 
SU_1_39_91 Sudan 
2_39_07 Sudan 
ИK_82 Former Yugoslavia 
ППУ_1999 Former Yugoslavia 
19_86 TBD 
ΛЈ 3V ξΓ¿ Egypt 
4 
10_83  Bulgaria 
71_71 People’s Republic of China 
121_71 People’s Republic of China 
3_И Former USSR 
270_E Former USSR (Ukraine) 
270_Д Former USSR (Ukraine) 
270_Г Former USSR (Ukraine) 
ИK_80 Former Yugoslavia 
ППУ_1981 Former Yugoslavia 
ZI_92 Zimbabwe 
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ع م ج_٢٧_٨٤ Egypt 
04_73 Former East Germany 
5 
10_99 Bulgaria 
539_И Former USSR (Ukraine) 
6 
71_99 People’s Republic of China 
311_06 People’s Republic of China 
811_06 People’s Republic of China 
7 
61_96 People’s Republic of China 
61_98 People’s Republic of China 
8 61_11 People’s Republic of China 
10 
71_98 People’s Republic of China 
811_07 People’s Republic of China 
11 821_07 People’s Republic of China 
13 
61_10 People’s Republic of China 
81_76 People’s Republic of China 
911_75 People’s Republic of China 
911_76 People’s Republic of China 
911_78 People’s Republic of China 
14 61_07 People’s Republic of China 
15 911_77 People’s Republic of China 
 
Chart by the Group (November 2016) 
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Annex 39: Stockpile security 
 
 
A building in Bukavu, located near to a primary school, was serving as an FARDC armoury. It was 
identified as a threat to the population, and the degraded materiel was destroyed.  
 
Photos by UNMAS 
 
